vocoder fingerprint
Single-Model Attribution for Spoofed Speech via Vocoder Fingerprints in an Open-World Setting
Pizarro, Matías, Laszkiewicz, Mike, Kolossa, Dorothea, Fischer, Asja
As speech generation technology advances, so do the potential threats of misusing spoofed speech signals. One way to address these threats is by attributing the signals to their source generative model. In this work, we are the first to tackle the single-model attribution task in an open-world setting, that is, we aim at identifying whether spoofed speech signals from unknown sources originate from a specific vocoder. We show that the standardized average residual between audio signals and their low-pass filtered or EnCodec filtered versions can serve as powerful vocoder fingerprints. The approach only requires data from the target vocoder and allows for simple but highly accurate distance-based model attribution. We demonstrate its effectiveness on LJSpeech and JSUT, achieving an average AUROC of over 99% in most settings. The accompanying robustness study shows that it is also resilient to noise levels up to a certain degree.
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.04)
- Europe > Italy > Calabria > Catanzaro Province > Catanzaro (0.04)
- Europe > Germany > Berlin (0.04)
- Information Technology > Security & Privacy (0.96)
- Law (0.68)
An Initial Investigation for Detecting Vocoder Fingerprints of Fake Audio
Yan, Xinrui, Yi, Jiangyan, Tao, Jianhua, Wang, Chenglong, Ma, Haoxin, Wang, Tao, Wang, Shiming, Fu, Ruibo
Many effective attempts have been made for fake audio detection. However, they can only provide detection results but no countermeasures to curb this harm. For many related practical applications, what model or algorithm generated the fake audio also is needed. Therefore, We propose a new problem for detecting vocoder fingerprints of fake audio. Experiments are conducted on the datasets synthesized by eight state-of-the-art vocoders. We have preliminarily explored the features and model architectures. The t-SNE visualization shows that different vocoders generate distinct vocoder fingerprints.
- Europe > Portugal > Lisbon > Lisbon (0.05)
- Asia > China > Beijing > Beijing (0.05)
- North America > United States > New York > New York County > New York City (0.04)
- Information Technology > Security & Privacy (0.93)
- Media (0.68)